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No-bodies: law, raciality and violence
Denise Ferreira da Silva*
When has it become a matter of fact – more than evidence, 
and yet not a self-evident ‘truth’ – that a (perhaps never to be 
known) number of young males and females perish as subjects 
of law’s preserving violence? In this article, this question will 
guide a consideration of a dimension of contemporary global 
existence that should become a theme of the theorising of the 
political. It describes a political scene in which the arms of 
the state – the police and the military – deploy total violence 
as a regulating tactic. More specifically, it reads the state’s 
occupations of Rio de Janeiro’s economically dispossessed 
neighbourhoods, where drug traffickers compete to institute the 
‘law of the land’, as enactments of a different kind of founding 
contract, racial violence signifies. In this account of the political 
(ethical-juridical) scene, the dead bodies of black and brown 
teenagers count not as casualties of urban wars, but as signifiers 
of the horizon of death. For the racial subaltern’s existence as 
1 Este artigo é apresentado tal como originalmente escrito. This article is 
presented as it was originally written. Este artículo se presenta tal como fue 
escrita originalmente. Questo articolo é presentato nella stessa forma in cui é 
stato scritto. Cet article est présenté comme il a été écrit. Dieser artikel wird 
präsentiert, wie sie ursprünglich geschrieben wurde.
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an effect of the tools of raciality (racial and cultural difference) 
unfolds in territories in which the state acts only in the name of 
its own preservation.We were terrified, all right…
What happened last night I don’t want that to happen to 
nobody.
No one deserves that, you know, not a human being.2
Where is that place where what should not ‘happen to nobody’ 
happens every day? Why is it that, in so many places found in 
every corner of the global space, so many human beings face 
that which ‘no one deserves’? What makes possible a mode of 
existence that spreads beyond the juridical borders of any given 
state and the ethical borders of every nation? In this article, I 
describe the context of emergence, conditions of production, and 
effects of deployment of the political/symbolic tools that design 
this particular ethical position. It is a position I locate when 
commenting on Rio de Janeiro state military police’s and the 
Brazilian Army’s occupations of the city of Rio de Janeiro’s black 
and brown economically dispossessed neighbourhoods (favelas). 
Each occupation was followed or preceded by confrontations 
between the military police and drug dealers that lasted from a 
few hours to a couple of weeks. The law enforcement tactics in 
these occupations go beyond ostensive patrolling of streets; they 
also include shooting from low-flying helicopters, deployment 
of armoured cars, and use of automatic guns. While the state 
government provides the basic social services – education, health, 
etc – to these neighbourhoods, its presence is more evident in 
2 This statement was made by the cousin of a 24-year-old Aboriginal man, Greg 
Harrison, killed in Melbourne in May 2005 by ‘a group of Albanians’ who 
‘yelled racial taunts’ and attacked them with baseball bats, according to his 
friends and relatives who survived the attack: ‘Father of Two Killed in “Race 
Attack”’, Sunday Age, 15 May 2005.
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these military actions, which have become the primary mode of 
management of the city’s economically dispossessed black and 
brown territories. 
During these occupations, favelas’ residents participate in 
scenes similar to the war scenes unfolding in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Palestine and other corners of the globe. To be sure, the ‘kill on site/
sight’ practice of Rio de Janeiro’s police does not make one wonder 
whether Rio’s favelas are concentration camps or battlefields, 
but rather prompts consideration of the question of what exactly 
is the difference between them. What I do here is situate these 
occupations of Rio’s favelas in the recent reconfiguration of the 
global political (ethical-juridical) stage that places the state at 
the frontlines of racial subjugation. More specifically, this article 
introduces a formulation of racial violence that captures how 
raciality immediately justifies the state’s decision to kill certain 
persons – mostly (but not only) young men and women of colour 
– in the name of self-preservation. Such killings do not unleash 
an ethical crisis because these persons’ bodies and the territories 
they inhabit always-already signify violence.
The itinerary that shows how raciality unravels the limits of 
the regulating (administration or government) suits of the nation-
state – in the collapsing of justice that exposes the violent face 
of the state – includes three steps. My first step is a description 
of the context of emergence and conditions of production of the 
notion of difference appropriated in social scientific accounts 
of human existence. This formulation of difference, I show, is 
comprehended in raciality, the onto-epistemological arsenal 
constituted by the concepts of the racial and the cultural, and 
their signifiers, those which produce persons (ethical-juridical) 
entities not comprehended by universality, the chosen moral 
descriptor of post-Enlightenment political configurations. The 
second step, the analysis of the effects of deployment of the 
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arsenal of raciality, begins with a discussion of how, in the 
global present, the Brazilian state justifies the deployment of the 
security architecture that is becoming the primary mode though 
which it engages its economically dispossessed black and brown 
populations. My analysis of these occupations of Rio de Janeiro’s 
favelas highlights how, because framed as necessary for the 
reappropriation of these territories, they constitute a mode of 
racial subjugation, namely racial violence, in which the state 
occupies the frontlines. Finally, the third step is not quite a 
conclusion. It simply introduces the case for the consideration 
of racial violence as a theme of political theorising. For what 
these occupations exemplify, I argue, is a moment of the political 
marked by the dis/appearance of the distinction between the law 
(as legality) and the state (as authority) that sustains the nation-
state’s claims to legitimacy. Before the black subject, signified 
in bodies and territories, the separation of the state’s protective 
and punitive mandates crumbles because there administration of 
justice (judgment) and law enforcement (punishment) resolve in/
to the state’s self-preserving force.
NECESSITAS
Necessity as a figuring of violence, a signifier of determination, 
preponderates in the assemblages of the theatre of reason found in 
seventeenth century writings of scientific and juridical universality. 
In both, reason signifies a universal power that operates from without, 
and in both the mind (the rational thing) retains self-determination, 
alone occupying the seat of decision (judgment) in knowledge and 
political existence. That is, the mind alone determines (resolves, 
judges, adjudges) the rules and motives through which universal 
reason governs, respectively, the motions of things and actions 
of human beings. When discussing the notion of power, John 
Locke rehearses the fundamental gesture that protects the mind in 
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self-determination, the displacement of exteriority, even before 
the unavoidable elevation of necessity under the aegis of universal 
reason. Power, that which ensures the beginning of action, he 
concedes, ‘includes relation’ – ‘a relation to action or change’, to be 
more precise. Nevertheless, the unevenness of this relation should 
be acknowledged because ‘sensible things’ and their ‘sensible 
qualities’ afford us just a notion of ‘passive power’3 – that is, 
reaction or affectability. With the distinction between ‘active’ and 
‘passive power’, he disavows the body to assert that true power, 
determination – which is the ‘beginning of action’ – resides in the 
mind alone. The mind, the sole exemplar of ‘active power’ (that 
which commands, orders, rules), according to Locke, has two 
powers – namely ‘will and understanding’: will affords the ability 
‘to begin or forebear, continue or end several actions of our minds, 
and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the 
mind ordering or as it were commanding, the doing or not doing 
such or such a particular’; while understanding, perception, refers 
to the abilities to know ‘ideas in our minds’.4
Early and later writings of determination, of necessity 
as a signifier of power, assert the mind’s privilege of self-
determination. Everywhere else, in the stage of exteriority, the 
one occupied by the body and other external things, universal 
reason governs as necessitas; in the shapes of force and order, it 
constrains, regulates or limits. It acts as the exterior power (as law 
or form) that composes and destroys the things of the universe.5
3 Locke (1894), pp 311–12.
4 Locke (1894), pp 313–14.
5 Newton (1846), p lxviii: ‘rational mechanics [as] the science of motions 
resulting from any forces whatsoever, and of forces required to produce any 
motion accurately proposed and demonstrated’. That is, the universality of 
laws – of motion, gravitation, etc – is only accessible to the mind because the 
later also participates in the attributes of reason.
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‘Decisive Power’
Locating law and the state in necessitas, as framings of 
universal reason as violence (force, power), seems to have been 
the main task before the early writers of juridical universality. 
Law and the state consistently refigure determination, but without 
undermining the rational thing’s (the mind’s) self-determination. 
Though both referents of juridical-political power have the dual 
task of protecting and punishing their subjects, the state (the 
sovereign) also has the obligation to preserve itself. In his classical 
statement on the modern sovereign, Thomas Hobbes acknowledges 
the artificial origin of the state, but insists that its creation results 
from the rational thing’s recognition of its necessity. ‘The final 
cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and 
dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon the 
selves,’ he postulates, ‘is the foresight of their own preservation 
… that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable 
condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been 
shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible 
power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment 
to the performance of their covenants, and observation of [the] 
Laws of Nature.’6
In the name of ‘peace and security’, according to the early 
writers of the ‘social contract’, the rational thing creates the 
political society, thus relinquishing the liberty enjoyed in the ‘state 
of nature’. For Hobbes, the need for individual protection and 
collective self-preservation defines the sovereign, ‘the essence of 
the Commonwealth’, which he defines as ‘one person, of whose 
acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, 
have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may 
6 Hobbes (1904), p 115.
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use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient 
for their peace and common defence’.7 When they do institute this 
protective political body, Locke would later postulate, the:
authori[se] the society … to make laws for him as the 
public good of the society shall require, to the execution 
whereof his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is 
due. And this puts men out of a state of Nature into 
that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth 
with authority to determine all the controversies and 
redress the injuries that may happen to any member of 
the commonwealth, which judge is the legislative or 
magistrates appointed by it.8
Exactly what does this ‘decisive power’ mean? This formal 
power, the artificial authority, instituted in obedience of the divine 
mandate for self-preservation, inhabits the moment of violence; it 
is a regulating, constraining and punishing force. ‘Political power’, 
as Locke defines it, is ‘a right of making laws, with penalties 
of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating 
and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the 
community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of 
the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the 
public good’.9
What both articulations of juridico-political power accom-
plish, I think, is to write law and the state in violence – the mode 
through which reason operates in necessity – when describing 
the ‘state of nature’ as the scene of violence. Both the state and 
law comprehend violence, in the authority to check individuals’ 
7 Hobbes (1904), p 119.
8 Locke (1887), p 236.
9 Locke (1887), p 192.
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threats to one another and external threats to the collective 
(political society) and in the authority to decide when to deploy 
its protective and punitive instruments. Emerging from a rational 
decision, the law and the state also refigure self-determination. 
For these are artefacts of the rational mind, the only existing 
thing capable of comprehending necessity because it is the only 
one that knows that these bodies that constraint/regulation would 
maintain, in political society, the sole rule of ‘divine nature’, 
namely the preservation of life.10
By recalling how juridical universality refigures self-
preservation, I am not raising anything that has not already 
been considered in legal and political theorising. From Austin’s 
writing of law as commands backed by threats, through Hart’s 
formalisation of law, and even Dworkin’s version of ‘law as 
integrity’, constraint remains the defining attribute of the juridical, 
whether resulting from rules or from the nature of adjudication.11 
More recently, Peter Fitzpatrick highlights this dual nature of the 
(legal) decision when, even as rewriting law in ‘ir/resolution’, he 
acknowledges that law operates precisely because of its internal 
struggle against the founding originary violence. In Freud’s 
account of the social order, Fitzpatrick argues: ‘Law finds its 
apotheosis in the determinant because it is imperatively set against 
a savage chaos, yet in the violence of its determination law remains 
10 Locke (1887), pp 193–94: ‘The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, 
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions … Every one, as he is 
bound to preserve himself, and … when his own preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and 
may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, 
or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods 
of another.’
11 See Austin (2000); Dworkin (1986); Hart (1994).
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also of the savage.’12 However, while the ‘savage’ (the signifier of 
violence) provides a kind of ground, it is no longer the negative 
‘other’ of modern philosophers’ allegories of the state of nature or 
racial theories’ lesser (because primitive, traditional, etc) ‘man’; 
it becomes the negative but interior ground on which the force 
of law stands. For Fitzpatrick, law is also a thing of freedom and 
necessity: on the one hand, as (collective) self-determination, law 
is that which replaces the primal father, the sovereign commander; 
however, on the other hand, law is that which replaces the chaos 
ensuing after the killing of the father when the brothers assume 
the responsibility for their protection/preservation. In sum, self-
determination and self-preservation refigure the violence that 
constitutes the unsettled core of law and the rigid armature of the 
state. And it is at work in deployments of universality to ground 
any determination (decision or judgment) regarding the ‘world of 
things’ or the ‘societies of men’.
Whence difference?
When describing the rearrangement that composed the 
epistemological context of the emergence of human sciences, 
Michel Foucault notes another Cartesian gift to modern thought. 
In classical thought, he argues, Descartes’ formal representation 
of comparison enables the assemblage of a ‘science of order’ and 
its two strategies: measurement, in which a designated common 
unity allows for the attribution of equality and inequality to 
the things of the world; and order, in which the enumeration of 
differences permits the demarcation of identities and the design 
of the classifying table. Much like calculating instituted physics 
as the scientific account of the universal laws of motion, ordering 
12 Fitzpatrick (2001), pp 3–4.
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deploys universality on to the domain of the simple and complex 
observable things. This was possible, Foucault argues, because 
of the designing of a language that resolved (in the mind) the 
endless abundance of things into a finite number of categories. 
Here, scientific reason governs through formalisation (and not 
regulation), which results from three distinct strategies: mathesis 
(‘ordering of simple natures’), taxonomia (‘table of visible 
differences’) and genesis (‘progressive series’). Because the other 
two are comprehended by taxonomia, ‘qualitative mathesis’,13 he 
postulates, the table is ‘the centre of knowledge in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries’.14
What makes the table a figuration of exterior determination, 
an instance of necessitas? Belonging to the moment of universal 
reason that Hegel decries as ‘dead reason’,15 the table refigures 
outer determination (exteriority/spatiality) when it arranges the 
things of nature (minerals, plants and animals) in a hierarchical grid 
organised by equality/inequality (mathesis), identities/difference 
(taxonomia) and the series of events (genesis). Unlike the other two 
epistemological arrangements Foucault describes, resemblance 
and the modern episteme, the classical table apprehends ‘nature’ in 
the fixity of its abstract (formal) typologies. In the scenography of 
formalisation, ‘nature’ remains in the moment of necessitas, where 
reason determines (from without) everything that can and will 
happen to things. The formulation of difference that emerged in this 
onto-epistemological context, which encapsulates both equality/
inequality and identity/difference, would guide the conditions 
of production of knowledge of human existence in two distinct 
epistemological configurations. First, in the classical natural 
13 Foucault (1994), p 74.
14 Foucault (1994), p 75.
15 Hegel (1977).
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history, it writes human difference as an effect of body and territory 
without, because it is here fully in the stage of exteriority, making 
any claims that these actualise or express the essence (interior) of the 
human and other things. Instead, natural history represents ‘nature’ 
as a collection of beings, which can be distributed in the ‘table of 
identities and difference’ because endowed with both measurable 
and classifiable (external) traits and subjected to the disturbing 
series of geological events. Beginning with observation, it deploys 
its formalising tools, ‘structure’ and ‘character’, which resolve the 
visible manifold into a few abstract notions – that is, knowledge 
occurs in the ordering of ‘nature’ according to a few abstract frames, 
namely form, number, proportion and situation.16 ‘In Classical 
terms’, Foucault posits, ‘a knowledge of empirical individuals can be 
acquired only from the continuous, ordered, and universal tabulation 
of all possible difference’.17 In short, natural history transformed the 
universe into a book, a text awaiting interpretation – once again, 
a task only the knowing mind could perform. ‘It is the exclusive 
property of man,’ Linneaus affirms, ‘to contemplate and to reason 
on the great book of nature. She gradually unfolds herself to him.’ 
Nevertheless, while he argues that this mode of knowing nature still 
depends on the ‘agency of the senses’, he sees the rational thing as 
alone responsible for the interpretation of ‘nature’.18
Formalisation governed the classical epistemological field 
through the notion of order. In this context, a notion of difference 
emerges that signifies vertical (measurement) and horizontal 
(classification) in/equality. Through abstraction – possible 
because of the a priori use of a common unity for measurement 
or the a posteriori delimitation of a unit (a type or kind) with 
16 Foucault (1994), p 134.
17 Foucault (1994), p 144.
18 Quoted in Eze (1997), p 11.
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the identification of a common characteristic – this ordering of 
the living world (human, plant and animal) produced a formal 
mapping of the existing things without having to find an answer 
to the question of how they come into being, other than the divine 
author and ruler’s productive desire. With the table, a figuring of 
the stage of exteriority, scientific reason makes its first incursion 
in the writing of human conditions. But it remains at the level of 
observation, description and classification of territories, bodies 
and modes of existence, which it used to designate human 
varieties. What it lacked – that which would mark the emergence 
of the modern episteme – was the privileging of interiority and 
temporality, the onto-epistemological presupposition that would 
produce the body and territory as signifiers of the mind.
Though Montesquieu and Locke before him could refer to 
the ‘savage’ as the ‘other’ of the rational beings ruled by law, 
they could not rely on anything other than the visible traits that 
populates the table of human difference. Put differently, beyond 
territory and the diverse modes of existence found among them, 
there was nothing else that could be called upon to write the 
difference between the ‘savage’ and the ‘European’. Why? For 
one thing, the rational thing’s uniqueness had been grounded on 
the specificity of its mind; if this mental particularity, rationality, 
was only an effect of territory, it could be bridged any time an 
‘other of Europe’ would leave its ‘original’ territory and move 
into a European space. As long as the classification of the human 
world depended solely on the observable, and as long as knowledge 
remained unconcerned with the interiority (the being) of things, 
the signifiers of racial difference (bodily and geographical traits) 
refigured universal reason as violence, the ordering (exterior) force, 
but they would not rewrite the mind as an effect of necessity, as it 
is represented in the laws of natural philosophy (classical physics) 
and the forms of natural history (classical biology).
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From natural history, then, the nineteenth century sciences of 
man and society inherited an account of human difference which 
comprehended modes of being human in the abstract (universal) 
units authorized by formalisation. To be sure, the classical table’s 
formal apprehension of the body and territory as signifiers of 
human difference would remain operative in the modern episteme, 
even if bracketed by historicity, in phenomenology (the text in 
which body and territory signify existence as an effect of self-
representation), biology (the text in which the body signifies 
existence as the effect of outer-determination) and sociology 
(the text in which the territory signifies existence as the effect of 
collective self-determination).
BEFORE LEGITIMACY
How can this grounding of universality in necessitas, the 
epistemological figuring of reason as violence, sustain an account 
of how raciality, a social scientific signifier of human difference, 
fashions the juridical architectures and procedures of the global 
present? Is it possible to do so without rehearsing raciality’s 
very production of the racial subaltern subject as the sole agent 
of violence? For instance, the notion of somatechnics suggests 
an approach to the political significance of racial difference that 
targets the ‘capillary space of connection and circulation between 
macropolitical structurations of power and micropolitical technics 
of subjugation’.19 Following a parallel path, here I read racial and 
cultural difference as a political signifiers, moments of deployment 
of power in the naming of modes of being human – that is, in the 
very designing of the notion of humanity now circulating in the 
global vocabulary. For this is necessary if the question implicit in 
19 Quoted in Pugliese and Stryker (2009), p 3.
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the opening quote is to be adequately and politically formulated; if 
one wishes to comprehend how is it possible that that which should 
happen to nobody, to ‘no human being’, has consistently delineated 
the existence of so many human beings – those whose bodies signify 
something that seem to escape all that should be comprehended by 
the Enlightenment notion of humanity, and its onto-epistemological 
descriptors, namely universality and historicity.
In this section, I set up the argument that formalisation (a 
tool and effect of scientific universality), the referent of the notion 
of difference refigured in the arsenal of raciality (in signifiers 
of racial and cultural difference), produces the racial subaltern 
subject as a mind that cannot occupy the seat of decision. That 
is, as a political-symbolic toolbox, raciality institutes an ethico-
juridical position that belongs in the stage of exteriority, one which 
post-Enlightenment articulations of universality and historicity 
fail to comprehend. With this claim, I am not arguing that racial 
subaltern subjects figure outside the domain of rights, as they stand 
in the letter of the law and the architectures and procedures of the 
administration justice. Neither individually nor collectively fully 
excluded from the text of rights, today’s racial subaltern subjects, 
virtually everywhere, can and do make demands for the respect 
of their civil and human rights in the national and global halls of 
justice. Nevertheless, I will show later, each and every one of these 
rights collapses when the state claims that it deploys its instruments 
to total violence for self-preservation.
Does it mean that, for instance, each occupation of, and armed 
confrontation in, Rio’s favelas constitutes an ipso facto suspension 
of law or an ad hoc declaration of the state of emergency? Possibly. 
Whether or not state of emergency is adequate to describe these 
occupations in the juridical language, there remains the question 
of their political-symbolic effect – namely, of their ethical 
significance. A consideration of legitimacy ensues whenever the 
133
No-boDies: law, raciality and violence
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 9 – n. 1 – p. 119-162 – jan./jun. 2014
state unleashes its ‘executive power’ in (or on the verge of a) 
breach of the rights of the citizenry. For, as Foucault argues, ‘the 
essential role of the theory of right is to establish the legitimacy of 
power’ – which it does by dissolving ‘the element of domination 
in power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced 
or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign 
on the one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other’.20 
Unmasking ‘domination’, unveiling the state’s self-defining 
violence, I think, requires more than a critique of the notion of 
right because, as I will discuss later, these occupations take place 
under the guise of a worldwide demand for the expansion of (civil 
and human) rights. Much of what I do in the analysis of these 
occupations is to unearth a modality of ‘disciplinary coercion’, 
the one which, according to Foucault, has been concealed under 
the grammar of legitimacy by ‘the establishment of public right 
articulated with collective sovereignty’.21 Tackling the question 
of legitimacy, I think, opens up a critical terrain which, though 
similar to Foucault’s studies of the mechanisms of disciplinary and 
biopower, re-centres juridical-political power. For one thing, as my 
reading shows, mapping the grounds for the state’s claims for the 
legitimacy of favelas’ occupation exposes how raciality refigures 
the simultaneous workings of disciplinary power and juridical-
political power, thereby rendering claims for and recognition of 
civil and human rights irrelevant.
With /out Legality
My discussion of legitimacy focuses on the ruling view that 
universality, as a principle and ontological descriptor, governs the 
20 Foucault (2003), p 26.
21 Foucault (2003), p 37.
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democratic polity because, I think, it more productively speaks 
to the question of how certain human beings’ civil and human 
rights so immediately disappear in the state’s decision to deploy 
its self-preserving forces in the territories it is supposed to protect. 
Though his was not the first, Max Weber’s account of universality 
as a modern ontological descriptor most directly speaks to how 
it composes the ethical grounds of the state. Exemplifying how 
legitimacy has been written to displace the moment of domination, 
Weber deploys his typology of motives to write the law and the 
state, in their modern variations, as effects of interior (cultural) 
determinants.22 When defining the political organization, he 
postulates that ‘A “ruling organization” will be called “political” 
insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded 
within a given territorial area by the threat and application of 
physical force’, but it will only ‘be called a “state” insofar as 
its administrative staff successfully claim the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’.23 
That is, while the state is a spatial (territorial) figure, its existence 
and continuation depend on its ethical hold, namely legitimacy. 
In the case of the modern state, its authority (domination) rests 
on the ‘belief in legality’, the ideas that: (a) ‘expediency or value-
rationality’ ground legal norms; and (b) ‘every body of law’ is a 
‘consistent system of abstract rules’ and ‘the administration of 
law is held to consist in the application of these rules to particular 
cases’. Further, the impersonal order (‘the law’) also comprehends 
‘the typical person in authority, the ‘superior’; the member of the 
organization ‘obeys … only the “the law”’.24 In sum, legality – 
22 Weber (1978), p 11: he defines motive as ‘a complex subjective meaning which 
seems to the actor himself or the observer an adequate ground for the conduct 
in question’.
23 Weber (1978), p 54, emphasis in original.
24 Weber (1978), pp 217–18.
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now a principle – grounds claims for legitimacy based on rational 
motives. Legal authority, according to Weber, rests on the view that 
‘the administration of law is held to consist in the application of 
these [abstract] rules to particular interests which are specified in 
the order governing the organisation within the limits laid down 
by legal precepts and following principles which are capable of 
generalised formulation and are approved in the order governing 
the group, or at least not disapproved by it’.25 What Weber does 
here – and it was later taken upon by Unger – is rewrite law as 
legality, the principle – the interior determinant of the social 
actions, relationships, organizations – that fashions modern social 
political configurations, and hence the grounds for the state’s 
legitimate use of violence within a given liberal territory.26
How could Locke’s instituted law, which he describes as an 
exterior (objective) force, become the interior (even if formal) 
determinant of post-Enlightenment European (political) particularity? 
The answer requires an account of how universality morphed into 
the principle actualised and expressed in Enlightenment European 
bodies and territories – or, to rephrase, how necessitas, as articulated 
in scientific and juridical universality, as an outer-determining 
(exterior) force, could become the interior ground for human action, 
the ruler of morality. For that to be possible, universal reason had 
to undergo transformations which allowed for the assertion of its 
sovereign ruling that did not undermine the writing of the mind as 
a self-determined thing.
The articulation of the notion of the transcendental, as 
Foucault argues, is key.27 This transformation took at least two 
moves. The first transformation, Immanuel Kant’s response to 
25 Weber (1978), p 217.
26 Unger (1976).
27 Foucault (1994).
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Hume’s challenge of the possibility of knowing with certainty, 
introduced the notion of the transcendental, which transformed 
universality into an effect of the (rational) mental apparatus, 
namely the understanding. When mapping the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge with certainty, Kant introduces the notion 
of transcendental reason (pure/formal) as that which provides 
the understanding with the tools – intuitions and categories – 
that comprehend the objective and necessary forces at work in 
phenomena, the modes through which the extent of things of 
the world is accessible to scientific knowledge.28 Consistently, 
when bringing transcendental reason to the consideration of 
human affairs – more specifically, morality – Kant re-enacts the 
protective disavowal of exteriority to rewrite the mind’s intimacy 
with its formal (interior) determinant. ‘There is therefore but one 
categorical imperative’, he postulates. ‘Act only on that maxim 
whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become 
a universal law.’29 While in his formulation of the moral law, 
self-determination remains a gift of reason, it now comes with 
the charge of transcendentality – that is, without any experiential, 
empirical, exterior determinant: ‘If therefore I were only a member 
of the world of understanding,’ Kant acknowledges, ‘then all my 
actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy 
of the pure will; if I were only a part of the world of sense, they 
[my actions] would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to 
the natural law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the 
heteronomy of nature.’30 That is, here the moral subject ought to 
emerge in mediated self-relation, in the presupposed identification 
of the rational mind with its transcendental (formal) producer. 
28 Kant (1990).
29 Kant (1956), p 88, emphasis in original.
30 Kant (1956), p 121.
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Though the negation of exteriority removes the possible violence 
(as a function of heteronomy, affectability) – always there in the 
relation with the (exterior) object of desire, inclination, etc – 
the Kantian determination of the moral subject (the productive 
symbolic gesture), namely formalisation, is in itself violent. 
For the grounding of morality in the formalising powers of 
the understanding, according to Herder, robs the human thing 
of its most cherished capacity, namely self-production or self-
development.31 Not surprisingly, the Kantian solution remained 
an insufficient articulation of universality as a moral guide. It 
was necessary to resolve the violence – here signified as formal 
(interiorised) mediation – inherent to scientific articulations of 
necessitas, namely calculation and formalisation.
The second transformation, G.F.W. Hegel’s rewriting of 
formal (transcendental) reason as a living (self-developing) 
force, resolved necessitas into a productive step in the self-
revealing (self-representing) trajectory of human consciousness. 
In Hegel’s version, universal reason becomes a transcendental 
self-determined (interior/temporal) force that is realised in post-
Enlightenment European minds and territories. The writing of 
transcendental reason as spirit, the self-producing, self-knowing, 
living force, transforms universality (and along with it self-
determination [freedom]) into an ontological descriptor, on which 
signifies (because an effect) a particular spatial/temporal juncture, 
namely the moment of transparency, where the revelation of 
transcendentality announces the end of the temporal trajectory 
of spirit. In this moment, self-consciousness, the rational thing, 
becomes the transparent I – for here, in the moment of ethical life, 
it learns of its fundamental identity with spirit and everything that 
31 Herder (2002).
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exists.32 When describing this moment, Hegel characterises it as 
the one when the good (‘the substantial universal of freedom’) 
and conscience (‘the purely abstract principle of determination’) 
resolve in ‘absolute certainty’.33 Ethical life, then, ‘is the Idea of 
Freedom in that on the one hand it is the good become alive – the 
good endowed in self-consciousness with knowing and willing 
and actualised by self-conscious action – while on the other hand 
self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its absolute foundation 
and the end which actuates in its effort. Thus ethical life is the 
concept of freedom developed in the existing world and the nature 
of self-consciousness.’34 Everything (the things of necessity and 
the things of freedom) is resolved here, in the scene of engulfment, 
the self-actualising temporal trajectory of spirit: ‘ethical order 
is freedom or the absolute will as what is objective, a circle of 
necessity whose moments are the ethical powers which regulate 
the lives of individuals’.35
Freedom and universality (an abstract signifier of morality) 
can now be reconciled in existence, because the stage of exteriority 
has become but spirit’s exhibition hall. Outer-determination, the 
effect of exteriority/spatiality Kant disavowed by writing moral 
law in mediated (formal) self-relation, is no longer a threat because 
all that lies outside of self-consciousness is but an actualisation 
of a (spatial/temporal) moment of spirit. When universality is 
interiorised, it becomes a principle and ontological descriptor, The 
state, as Hegel describes it, becomes ‘the actuality of the substantial 
will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness 
once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its 
32 Hegel (1977).
33 Hegel (1967), p 103.
34 Hegel (1967), p 105.
35 Hegel (1967), p 105.
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universality. This substantial unity is an absolute unmoved end in 
itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other 
hand, this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose 
supreme duty is to be a member of the state.’36 Further, law (as the 
constitution) is particular only because it expresses the ‘character 
and development’ of the nation’s ‘self-consciousness’37 – that is, as 
spirit continues its journey, there is nothing that could prevent the 
laws of a nation from developing into expressions of universality.
Consistently, when addressing ‘the problem of sovereignty’, 
Hegel raises the points that would become central in Weber’s 
formulations, as both the power and authority of the state and of 
its ‘individual functionaries and agents’ rests on universality – that 
is, ‘sovereignty depends on the fact that the particular functions 
and powers of the state are not self-subsistent or firmly grounded 
either on their own account or in the particular will of the individual 
functionaries, but have their roots ultimately in the unit of the state 
as their single self’.38 What protects the state from (subjective) 
particularity is these ungrounded conditions, which do not resolve 
into the will of any individual ruler. Under the aegis of historicity, 
the mode of becoming of spirit, universality, as a principle rules 
ethical life through and through only because it describes the 
ethical-juridical totality, figured by the nation and the state – in 
the late nineteenth century consolidated in the hybrid (ethical-
juridical) political entity, namely the nation-state – that marks 
the end of the trajectory of spirit. When he rewrites universality 
as a marker of the end of spirit’s trajectory, Hegel opens up the 
possibility for reformulating other renderings of universality. By 
bringing transcendental reason to existence through the engulfment 
36 Hegel (1967), pp 155–56.
37 Hegel (1967), p 179.
38 Hegel (1967), pp 179–80.
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of the stage of exteriority, Hegel’s accomplishment marks the onto-
epistemological transformation that authorised scientific reason to 
venture into the sacred terrain of freedom.
When describing the context of articulation of classical 
difference in post-Enlightenment scientific writings of human 
existence,39 I argue that Hegel’s resolution of spatiality into 
temporality, the engulfment of exteriority, opened up the possibility 
for a knowledge project that approached the mind as an object 
of the tools of necessitas without removing the rational things 
from the stage of (freedom) interiority. What I do is describe 
the conditions of production of racial and cultural difference 
as signifiers of human (moral and intellectual) difference in 
nineteenth and twentieth century versions of the anthropological 
and sociological projects. More specifically, I show how the 
arsenal of raciality apprehends the body and territory – in the 
nineteenth century as ‘racial types’ or forms, as signifiers of two 
fundamentally distinct kinds of minds: the transparent I, the post-
Enlightenment white/European, the ones who actualise/express 
the final actualization of Spirit, and the affectable I, ‘the others 
of Europe’, those whose mind actualised/expressed the effects of 
productive reason as comprehended by the productive tools (‘laws’ 
and ‘forms’) of the understanding. I will not repeat the whole 
argument here except to say that my mapping of the analytics of 
raciality shows how, in scientific rewritings of the human body 
and territory, self-determination remains the exclusive attribute of 
the rational mind, which exists in the kingdom of freedom, where 
transcendentality is realised, namely where reside the ethical-
juridical things of reason, modern subjects whose thoughts, actions 
and territories refigure universality.
39 Ferreira de Silva (2007).
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My mapping of raciality unearths how this political-symbolic 
arsenal that refigures a power-effect of necessitas (formalisation) 
produces the ‘others of Europe’ in affectability, as subjects which 
do not play in ethical life. There, the others of Europe alone inhabit 
the realm of necessitas, thoroughly subjected to the constraining/
regulating power which produces and determines the parts and 
movements of their bodies, thus responding for the inferior quality 
of their minds, which is signified in modes of existence flourishing 
in their territories. Nevertheless, because the self-determined thing 
cannot be so if it emerges in a relationship – and the apparatuses of 
social scientific knowledge cannot but produce types, categories, 
particulars that necessarily relate to each other as instances of the 
productive nomos (the shape of necessitas when engulfed by spirit) 
– the tools of raciality produce the others of Europe as always 
already vanishing, either for the weakness of their affectable 
minds or when confronting the ‘active power’ of the transparent 
I. Put differently, raciality produces both the subject of ethical 
life, who the halls of law and forces of the state protect, and the 
subjects of necessitas, the racial subaltern subjects whose bodies 
and territories, the global present, have become places where the 
state deploys its forces of self-preservation.
The security turn
Anyone who lived in the city of Rio de Janeiro’s economically 
dispossessed areas (favelas and housing projects), in the 1960s and 
1970s grew up in spaces where the forces of law enforcement – Rio 
de Janeiro state’s civil and military police – had a more consistent 
presence than the state’s biopolitical apparatuses. Because the 
armed resistance to the military dictatorship recruited primarily 
among the educated middle class, none of us ever imagined that the 
state’s self-preserving forces (army, air force or navy), even under 
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a state of emergency, would be deployed in our neighbourhoods. 
Not until recently, that is. Over the past few years, the Brazilian 
army has been called to act as an agent of law enforcement on a 
number of occasions. In early 2006, it happened because some time 
in early March or late in the previous month, weapons were stolen 
from an army facility in Rio de Janeiro. A few days later, without a 
declaration of emergency, the Brazilian army was deployed in the 
city – about 1,600 troops occupied ten favelas in Rio de Janeiro. 
After less than two weeks, the federal troops departed the city, 
with the stolen weapons, leaving at least one person dead, publicly 
denigrated in the national press but without any public calls from 
the left for a revolutionary response or from the left or the right 
for the return of the rule of law.40
Under what authority could the self-preserving forces of the 
state ‘legitimately’ be deployed within national boundaries without 
an official suspension of the rule of law, a public declaration of 
the state of emergency? Whether a ‘global society’ (cosmopolitan 
or fragmented) or a new empire describes the present global 
configuration, there is no question that, in the past 20 years or so, 
states have been busy assembling the neoliberal juridical-economic 
program that governs all of them. The directives of this ‘global 
contract’, or the global mandate, found in the agreements setting 
up the multilateral bodies (such as the APEC, Mercosur or the 
European Union), have instituted the global free marketplace: 
economic reforms (de-regulamentation, elimination of trade 
barriers and stimulus to private investment); inclusive democracy 
(measures that expand citizenship rights through mechanisms 
that promote the inclusion of women, people of colour and other 
socially excluded groups, and the protection of human rights); 
40 Major Brazilian newspapers covered this event. See, for instance, Folha de São 
Paulo’s full coverage of the event at www.folha.uol.com.br/folha/especial/2006/
exercitonorio.
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and security architectures (such as Plan Colombia and the Merida 
Initiative, which includes military [financial, personnel, weapons, 
and intelligence] aid).41 
The contradictions of neoliberal capitalism are both more 
elusive and more complex than classical historical materialism 
could have anticipated. For instance, when looked separately 
it is impossible to imagine how, for instance, working-class 
black youth in Brazil might benefit from inclusive democracy 
(such as affirmative action policies) if the economic reforms had 
not created a situation of precarious (‘flexible-’, sub-, or un-) 
employment for their parents. Furthermore, the same activists 
and intellectuals that attack economic reforms also celebrate the 
inclusive democracy measures, such as recognition of indigenous 
land rights, the creation of institutional means to address the effect 
of gender subjugation and recognition of the rights of children. 
More importantly, because economic reforms have received 
more scholarly and media attention, much of the reshaping of 
41 The latest is the 2008 NAFTA Security Prosperity partnership, which has 
been consolidated in the Merida Initiative: ‘The Letter of Agreement today 
makes available $197 million dollars of the $400 million the U.S. Congress 
approved in fiscal year 2008 supplemental funds. More than $136 million is 
already being used in the fight against crime through military cooperation and 
Economic Support Fund accounts, which also form part of the Merida Initiative. 
The remainder of the $400 million consists of $43 million which the U.S. 
Congress will release once we have met internal reporting requirements, and 
$24 million to develop and administer the Initiative. This $400 million from 
the FY2008 supplemental spending bill represents the first installment of the 
$1.4 billion in support the United States has committed to provide over the next 
three years.’ http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4497. According to the Mexican 
Ambassador to the United States, it show how: ‘Together, the governments of 
the United States and Mexico will continue to fight the scourge of drugs and 
narco-trafficking, but in order to succeed we will need the support of the people 
of both our countries. I am confident that, together, we will succeed in bringing 
greater security and prosperity to our nations’. See www.usembassy-mexico.
gov/eng/Ambassador/eA081203Jointdeclaration.html.
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the state that has taken place under the global mandate has been 
ignored. How the global mandate functions as new configuration 
of the global political scene only becomes evident, I think, if one 
looks simultaneously at the intersection of the three moments. 
Unfortunately, I do not have space to develop this argument here. 
Let me just say that it speaks directly to the fact that, in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and elsewhere, the number of young 
men and women in the sphere of narco-trafficking has grown 
exponentially over the past 20 years.
Perhaps the least exposed dimension of the neoliberal program 
is the fact that, while the state everywhere has dramatically reduced 
their presence in the economy, the assembling of the juridical 
architecture of free trade has also included measures that allow 
it to play a large role in law enforcement. For almost eight years, 
the architectures and procedures of national security have become 
an unescapable fact in the United States. Built under the claim 
that it was necessary for protection from foreign threats, this 
enormous apparatus – which is a good example of how the state 
has not shrunk under the global mandate – has recently shifted its 
targets from the phantasmagoric ‘terrorist’ toward the ubiquitous 
‘undocumented immigrant’, which it seeks along the country’s 
borders, in rural areas, and in large and small cities. Following 
the security turn, the Brazilian government began building a 
‘homeland security’ apparatus of its own with the launching of the 
National Program of Public Security with Citizenship (Programa 
National de Segurança Pública com Cidadania, or PRONASCI), 
which includes 94 projects to be managed in partnerships formed 
between the federal, state, city governments and economically 
dispossessed communities. According to the Ministry of Justice, 
the program is a unique ‘initiative in the confrontation with 
criminality in the country. The project articulates security policies 
with social initiatives; [it] prioritises prevention and seeks to 
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reach the causes of violence, without relinquishing the strategies 
necessary to ensure social order and public security.’ On the 
website, the highlights (what the Ministry of Justice probably 
finds most attractive to the public) of the project include two 
social actions: ‘Women of Peace’, designed to train women to 
educate their communities about the ills of violence and ‘Protejo’ 
(Project for the Protection of Youth in Vulnerable Territories), 
which ‘focuses on citizenship formation … through sports, cultural 
and educational activities’. Most of the  mentioned  initiatives, 
which   include  the  National  Security Force (Força Nacional de 
Segurança Pública), an elite squad created in 2004, are directed 
to the training and protection of police officers and other law 
enforcement agents.42
What justifies this conflation of law enforcement (state-level 
policing) and self-preserving (national security) forces? When 
commenting on actions by drug dealers in January 2007, Brazil’s 
president, Luis Inacio (Lula) da Silva, deploys the familiar trope 
of the ‘enemy within’ to justify this reconfiguring of the country’s 
forces: ‘This … cannot be treated as common crime. This is 
terrorism and it should be treated with a strong political gesture 
and the strong hand of the Brazilian State.’ How do the actions 
themselves, the killing by drug dealers of favelas’ residents, 
authorise the elimination of the distinction between ‘crime’ and 
‘terrorism’ – a distinction that holds because the latter has been 
usually circumscribed to attacks that target the state? While 
President Lula did not find it necessary to fill in the blanks, to 
specify how the distinction between ‘crime’ and ‘terrorism’ was 
breached, he mentions all-too-familiar sociological explanations 
for crime to describe what he calls ‘terrorist actions’:
42 See Ministério da Justiça, Brasil at www.mj. gov.br/data/ Pages/MJF4F53A 
B1PTBRNN.htm.
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If there is disaggregation in the family, if the father and 
the mother don’t get along, everything will be difficult 
… This violence results from accumulated historical 
errors by the whole society, it should take responsibility 
and help the state, local, and federal government to find 
a definitive solution.
The solution he introduces in this speech was the creation of 
a National Security Force, a federal police force, the function of 
which is to help Rio de Janeiro’s state police. Why? ‘Because,’ the 
Brazilian president states, ‘we have to guarantee the right of free 
and honest men to leave their homes in the morning and return in 
the evening. We cannot allow disturbance at home, disturbance in 
the states. This is not a man’s, a party’s task. This is the task of the 
whole nation.’43 What he articulates is the moral mandate of the 
nation and the charge of the state to protect ‘free and honest men’ 
from drug-related violence of the ‘criminals’, which he attributes, 
as if a good sociologist, to the ‘disaggregation of the family’. The 
problem, however, resides in how this distinction between ‘free 
and honest men’ and the ‘marginal’ already justifies the existence 
and the deployment of the forces of law enforcement – the task 
of which is to protect citizens from one another.
What, then, explains the excess, the creation of an extra arm 
– the National Security Force – when increasing the numbers of 
law enforcement officers would be enough? This excess, I think 
– the deployment of the self-preserving forces of the state in the 
favelas – is prefigured in sociological rendering of raciality, which 
produces favelas – any community, neighbourhood or country, 
for that matter – as affectable (pathological) territories, as moral 
regions ruled by necessitas. The same field of studies that provides 
43 ‘Lula: Onda de Violência no Rio não é crime comun, é terrorismo’, O Globo, 
1 January 2007.
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us with crime statistics, usually used in claims for more state 
(juridico or biopolitical) presence, has also provided us an account 
of racial subjugation that writes cultural (moral) difference as an 
expression and producer of the ‘social ills’ or ‘social dislocations’ 
(‘crime’, ‘female-headed households’, ‘unstable families’, ‘drugs’, 
‘welfare dependence’, etc) found in these territories. From Gunnar 
Myrdal’s use of Richard Wright’s ‘Bigger Thomas’ to describe the 
‘a-social’ social subject, he found ‘walking the streets unemployed; 
standing around on the corners; or laughing, playing, and fighting 
in the joints and poolrooms everywhere in the Negro slums of 
American cities’, and demonstrate ‘a general recklessness about 
their own and others’ personal security and property, which gives 
one a feeling that carelessness, asociality, and fear have reached 
their zenith’.44 From mid-1940s sociological studies, through 
William Julius Wilson’s neo-liberal trilogy,45 into the latest writings 
on criminology and ‘gang’ activity, this ‘marginal’ figure has been 
consistently written as a product of the social conditions found in 
the places inhabited, as Kenneth Clark states, by ‘the pathologies 
of the ghetto community [which] perpetuate themselves through 
cumulative ugliness, deterioration and isolation and strengthen the 
Negro’s sense of worthlessness’.46 He continues:
Not only is the pathology of the ghetto self-perpetuating, 
but one kind of pathology breeds another. The child 
born in the ghetto is more likely to come into a world of 
broken homes and illegitimacy; and this family and social 
instability is conducive to delinquency, drug addiction, 
44 Myrdal (1944), p 763.
45 I am referring here to Wilson’s (1978, 1987, and 1997) books, which have 
framed much of the neo-conservative racial discourse and US racial policy for 
the past 25 years or so.
46 Clark (1965), p 12.
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47 Clark (1965), p 81, my emphasis. Clark’s description is just an example of 
the basic mid-twentieth century sociological rendering of raciality, in which 
cultural difference becomes the privileged marker of human difference. Kelley 
(1997), pp 16–17: he agues, that the social scientific literature on the ghetto 
produced in the 1960s and 1970s ‘not only conflates behavior with culture, 
but when social scientists explore “expressive” cultural forms or what has 
been called “popular culture” (such as language, music and style), most 
reduce it to expressions of pathology, compensatory behavior or creative 
“coping mechanisms” to deal with racism and poverty’. Nor has this argument 
disappeared from the sociological literature.
and criminal violence. Neither instability nor crime can 
be controlled by police vigilance or by reliance on 
the alleged deterring forces of legal punishment, for 
the individual crimes are to be understood more as 
symptoms of the contagious sickness of the community 
itself than as the result of inherent criminal or deliberate 
viciousness.47
My point here is that the justification for the deployment 
of the forces of self-preservation already resides in President 
Lula’s sociological truth, which represents black and brown 
economically dispossessed urban regions, like Rio’s favelas, as 
affectable territories, political (ethical-juridical) regions with/out 
law. Because they are always already constructed as indigenous 
zones of violence, there the state must necessarily show its self-
preserving face. Hence President Lula’s in/distinction between 
‘crime’ and ‘terror’ is superseded by how raciality always already 
renders in/significant his distinction between ‘free and honest men’ 
and ‘criminal/ terrorists’. Because the latter exist in the moral in/
difference raciality inscribes in these territories, anyone, everyone, 
any person, the (ethical-juridical) entity, residing there does not 
figure the subject of ethical life, the self-determined persons the 
law and the state protect; before these juridical structures, these 
racial subaltern subjects are nobodies.
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Black flags, white skulls
April 2008. My parents and I were following on TV and the 
newspapers the unfolding of a weeklong occupation of the favela 
Vila Cruzeiro when news broke about a confrontation in another 
neighbourhood, Cidade de Deus. A major newspaper reported that 
10 drug dealers were killed during the action, including the leader. 
‘Besides the dealers,’ the TV report informed us, ‘a 70-year old 
housewife died [as the] victim of a stray bullet. Two other people 
were wounded. [The] cops apprehended three assault weapons, 
two hand grenades, two and a half kilos of cocaine, and two 
stolen motorcycles.’ The 70-year-old lady and her two also elderly 
friends (who were wounded) were returning from the supermarket 
when they were caught in the crossfire. ‘To avoid protests by 
the residents,’ the paper reported, the police commander in the 
area ordered the occupation of Cidade de Deus.48 The report also 
mentioned the weapons (including photos) and highlighted the 
fact that some of them were ‘normally used by the armed forces 
and the military police special forces’. And it included two pieces 
on the killed drug lord – one mentioned his friendship with drug 
lords in other favelas and commented on the fact that he ‘had a 
good relationship with the community and avoided participation 
in confrontations with the police’; the other was about his 11-year-
old daughter, who had been killed by a stray bullet during a 
confrontation between the police and the dealers in Vila Cruzeiro 
the previous month. Besides the girl, we learned, another five 
people, ‘among them two other children who played with her’, 
were killed during the operation.
Located in a part of Rio the locals call ‘The Gaza Strip’, Vila 
Cruzeiro has been occupied several times in the past few years. 
48‘Cerca de 150 policiais militares fazem operação contra o tráfico na Cidade de 
Deus’, O Globo, 25 April 2008.
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At the beginning of the April 2008 operation, the commander, 
Colonel Marcus Jardim, told the press that the occupation was 
meant to ensure the state’s exercise of its biopolitical, public health 
services tasks. ‘The first objective of the operation,’ he stated, 
‘was to respond to some people’s complaints of the difficulty 
to leave their homes [to be treated for dengue fever] because of 
barriers and physical obstacles imposed by the narco-trafficking.’ 
When questioned about the number of casualties, he said: ‘The 
PM [military police] is the best remedy for dengue … it does not 
leave one mosquito on its feet’, and stated that: ‘The PM is there 
to protect. If nine people were killed, it is because it was a difficult 
and bloody battle. We need to respond in the same proportion as 
the criminals. The action is legal, legitimate and the corporation 
has to act in accordance with the society’s interests.’49 A week 
later, the police officers, member of the elite squad known as 
BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Especiais), ‘spread a black flag 
with a skull’, the symbol of the squad, ‘on the highest point of the 
hill [where the favela is situated]. The officers said that they were 
celebrating the expulsion of the drug dealer … [they also said that] 
it is common to put up flags’ – according to a lieutenant the paper 
quotes, it ‘is the symbol of total occupation.’ A day later, ‘about 
100 members of the elite squad remained on the top of the hill. 
They occupied the local police stations.’ The black flag was then 
‘placed in the front of the [police] station’.50
If the police intervened to protect Vila Cruzeiro’s residents’ 
access to ‘citizenship’ public health services, why does the 
choreography of the occupation only included visual and verbal 
signifiers of death? It seems to me that the objective of these actions 
49 ‘Policiais voltam a trocar tiros com traficantes na Vila Cruzeiro’ and ‘ONGs critical 
Coronel que chamau a polícia de “inseticida social”’, O Globo, 16 April 2008.
50 ‘Bope hasteia bandeira na Vila Cruzeiro’, O Globo, 21 April 2008.
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is a symbolic reappropriation of the territory but not necessarily 
the return of its inhabitants to the protected region of legality. 
That 70-year-old housewives and little girls – and many others hit 
by stray bullets or unarmed favela residents who have been shot 
by the police – are killed is justifiable when the killing happens 
in territories where ‘free and honest men and their families’ and 
the ‘criminals and their families’ exist in/difference. They are 
unfortunate deaths, but necessary because they are caused by 
the state’s legitimate deployment of its self-preserving forces in 
the attempt to reappropriate symbolically the territory of death – 
hence the black flag with prominent white skulls displayed in the 
occupation apparatuses, including the caveirão, the armoured cars 
whose approach empties the streets of the favelas.
That the assertion of the state’s authority renders such 
deployments of total violence legitimate was conveyed by Rio de 
Janeiro state’s Governor Sergio Cabral when he was asked about the 
killing of ‘working men’ during the occupation of another favela:
For three years, there had not been an operation of this 
kind, with 350 officers. The marginal were not afraid of 
going to the streets. They were acting during the day, with 
powerful weapons, stopping and killing people. The state 
cannot accept this. This is not an ideological issue. It makes 
no difference if I am called violent.51
What Governor Cabral suggests here is that, in these 
occupations, the state intervenes not to protect its citizens but to 
preserve itself, to reassert its exclusive right to deploy death in 
these territories. That this in/difference refigures an un-resolvable 
moral (cultural) difference, because an effect of necessitas, 
51 ‘Cabral defende aborto como forma de combate à violência no país’, G1, 24 
October 2007.
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signified in black bodies and territories is exemplified in Governor 
Cabral’s defense of legal abortion, a few months earlier:
The issue of interruption of pregnancy is related to 
public violence… If you consider the number of children 
per mother in Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, Tijuca, Méier 
e Copacabana [white/middle class neighbourhoods], 
you find a Swedish pattern. Now, if you take Roçinha 
[favela]. The model is Zambia, Gabon. This is a factory 
of criminals.52
No wonder that when the elite squad of state’s military 
police forces occupy this ‘factory of criminals’, death (the 
referent of Necessitas, the Roman goddess of destiny) signifies 
reappropriation, where the black flag and its prominent skull 
signify the end(s) of the state action.
My point is that the skull, a signifier of death, can only signify 
the state’s deadly forces’ right to kill. Killing anyone alone signifies 
reappropriation of these territories. That is, in these territories the 
state’s right to kill is always-already legitimate. Not because it is 
unleashed for the protection of lives of favelas’ residents, there 
the state acts to preserve itself. During the territorial disputes 
between the state and drug dealers, the (civil, social, human) rights 
of residents are immediately suspended – the administration of 
justice collapses in law enforcement – for law as a protective force 
does not embrace the residents of Cidade de Deus, Vila Cruzeiro 
and other favelas. In the crossfire between the police, the army 
and drug dealers, they inhabit a position that political theorising 
has yet to bring under consideration. From that position, the one 
that gazes at the horizon of death, it is impossible to distinguish 
52 ‘Cabral defende aborto como forma de combate à violência no país’, O G1, 
24 October 2007 and ‘Gobernador de Rio de Janeiro Promueve Legalizar el 
aborto … para diminuir criminales’, Aciprensa, 26 October 2007.
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between the police’s law-enforcing and the drug dealers’ law-
breaking actions. This in-difference refigures the particular mode 
though which, in the global present, the state performs its role 
in racial subjugation. For this reason, I think, the dead bodies of 
black and brown teenagers count not as casualties of urban wars, 
unleashed because the state needs to recuperate the inhabitants of 
these spaces back into its ethical fold. In this affectable territory 
the state performs in/difference; for the favelas’ residents are no-
bodies as their existence unfolds before (in front of) ethical life, 
the ethical-juridical territory the architectures and procedures of 
law enforcement are designed to protect.
Naming this mode of operation of the state racial violence 
distinguishes it from moments of deployment of the state’s violent 
arms, which either necessitate the mechanisms of administration of 
justice or require that the state justify why these are unnecessary 
through the naming of the enemy. The naming of the enemy, in 
these instances, becomes unnecessary, because in these occupied 
territories, raciality institutes an in/difference between state 
protective and self-preserving tasks, which collapses the moment 
of administration of justice in/to law enforcement, and the claim 
to the right to self-preservation (exemplified above by President 
Lula’s and Governor Cabral’s statements) annuls demands for 
ethical condemnation and legal redress.
NOTES TOWARDS A CRITICAL PROGRAM
From the juridical point of view, the killing on site/on sight 
of favela residents – regardless of whether or not they are involved 
in drug trafficking – could be read as an instance of Kant’s jus 
necessitatis (right of necessity), which applies to a subjectively 
determined act, the kind that is altogether beyond condemnation 
(inculpable), but which is ‘only to be adjudged as exempt from 
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punishment (impunibile).53 We are familiar with jus necessitatis 
in criminal cases when self-preservation (self-defence) is used to 
justify the killing of a person – as in the case of the police officers 
who were acquitted of the killing of Amadou Diallo.54 My argument 
in the preceding analysis, however, is that justification, as in the 
case of these occupations of Rio’s economically dispossessed black 
and brown territories, precedes the deployment of the state’s deadly 
forces. This is not, however, because the state has now acquired some 
kind of subjective dimension, but because self-preservation (as a duty 
and right) is already articulated the writings of the modern sovereign. 
Neither a pre-existing nor a thus named enemy, I think, justifies 
deployments of racial violence. For racial violence, as defined here, 
refers us fully back to necessitas; the in/difference justifying these 
occupations is neither (god-) given nor the effect of after the fact 
dehumanisation. This in/difference, which marks an ethical position, 
is always-already signified in the bodies and territories of the racial 
subaltern subject which social scientific instruments of racial truth 
write as expressions and producers of affectable subjects, those of 
human beings whose particularity/difference the formal (exterior/
spatial) tools of racial knowledge produce as subject of necessitas 
(outer-determination) and not life (self-determination).
For this reason, I do not think that Giorgio Agamben’s 
rewriting of biopower is an appropriate guide for the analysis of 
the mechanisms of racial subjugation at work in the global present. 
While his formulation of biopower returns to the ‘problem of 
sovereignty’ without reinscribing interiority through a rearticulation 
of legitimacy, his recuperation of the state as the absolute locus of 
power, by returning total violence to the writing of the political, 
negates (articulates and disavows) exteriority in a double strike. 
53 Kant (2002), p 52.
54 Author (forthcoming).
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On the one hand, Agamben returns sovereignty to the relationship 
with the subject’s naked body. For ‘bare life’, the one ‘who may 
be killed and yet not sacrificed’ does no more than to demarcate 
the very borders of the polis (an ethical-juridical space), where 
sovereignty emerges as absolute authority.55 Recalling Foucault’s 
description of royal punishment, with imagery of the ‘bare life’ 
in the Nazi concentration camp, he disassociates his formulation 
of biopower from Foucault’s mapping of the mechanisms of 
productive regulation through which universal reason governs and 
produces (individual and the social) bodies. On the other hand, he 
resolves the political back into the social (the political space of 
the nation-state) where the sovereign exercises its legitimate (legal 
and moral) authority. Nevertheless, when Agamben dismisses 
Schmitt’s friend/enemy pair, which situates the political in the 
relationship between sovereigns (modern states), he retrieves the 
political back from exteriority, which the social threatens to signify, 
by writing it in potentiality. Because it names a self-productive 
exclusion, bare life does not refer to the outside of the law, but to 
when it operates in its suspension: ‘An act is sovereign,’ Agamben 
explains, ‘when it realises itself by simply taking away its own 
potentiality not to be, letting itself be.’56 Self-determination and 
self-preservation, the sovereign’s distinguishing attribute and 
highest duty, are deployed, but now protected in potentiality, as 
self-relation, which takes place between the sovereign that is 
and is not there – in what he calls the ‘zone of indistinction’. For 
Agamben, the ban, the kind of relation the exception signifies, 
‘is the form of pure reference to something in general, which is 
to say, the simple positing of a relation with the nonrelational’.57
55 Agamben (1995), p 8.
56 Agamben (1995), p 46.
57 Agamben (1995), p 29.
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Even if I concede that the occupations of Rio’s favelas may 
be read as ad hoc declarations of the state of exception, the key 
difference between Agamben’s bare life and my reading of racial 
violence, I think, resides in how he writes the ban as an act of 
dehumanisation, the stripping off of legal and moral protection (the 
‘ban’), that which produces the bare life, the naked body before 
which sovereignty appears as naked (total) violence. Beginning 
with the conception of the body, I read the human body as inscribed 
by the arsenal of scientific reason, the instruments of productive 
violence, always-already comprehended by the tools of raciality, 
namely social scientific signifiers of human (racial and cultural) 
difference. For Agamben deploys the body to signify life (as zoe 
or ‘the simple fact of living common to all living beings’):58 ‘If it 
is true that the law needs a body in order to be in force, and if one 
can speak, in this sense of ‘law’s desire to have a body’, democracy 
responds to this desire by compelling law to assumed the care 
of this body’.59 That is, the political decision that distinguishes 
biopower, he argues, refers to ‘the value and nonvalue of life’ as 
such – that is, a bare life without law and culture. This difference 
is explicit in his analysis of the Holocaust, in his account of 
Hitler’s decision on the non-value of Jews, homosexuals and 
others. Though Agamben acknowledges that racial knowledge 
(nineteenth century science of man) provides the Nazi regime with 
formulations which allow that the ‘care for life would coincide 
with the fight against the enemy’,60 he argues that racism as a 
political ideology marks the ‘paradox of Nazi biopolitics and the 
necessity by which it was bound to submit life itself to an incessant 
political mobilization could not be expressed better than by this 
58 Agamben (1995), p 1.
59 Agamben (1995), p 125.
60 Agamben (1995), p 145.
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transformation of natural heredity into a political task’.61 Much 
like Foucault’s, his use of the Nazi model of racial power limits 
readings of racial subjection as a political fact. For the reduction 
of racial signification to ‘natural heredity’, of the body as a thing 
without history and without science – which is consistent with the 
post-World War II move to ban the racial from modern vocabulary 
– only renders raciality a political matter, following the logic of 
exclusion, when racial difference is used to excuse personal and 
collective prejudices and agendas.
What, then, comprehends racial violence – the fact that 
before racial subaltern subjects the state exercises only its right to 
self-preservation? My excavations of modern representation in an 
earlier project revealed that the deployment of the tools of raciality 
has instituted globality as a modern onto-epistemological horizon. 
Unlike historicity, the preferred ontological descriptor that writes 
modern subjects as self-determined (interior/temporal) things, the 
political-symbolic arsenal that confectioned globality institutes 
post-Enlightenment modern subjects as racial things, universal 
entities that signify necessitas, thus establishing an unresolvable 
distinction between the self-determined I and its affectable others. 
There I also show how critical analyses of racial subjugation miss 
the more insidious effects of raciality because they rely on the logic 
of exclusion, which assumes that universality does encompass 
every mode of being human, that racial subjugation only persists 
because modern social configurations have yet to realise (fully) 
its universal claims. What the notion of racial violence does is to 
capture the workings of the most insidious power effect of raciality, 
the logic of obliteration, which is inscribed in the very production 
of racial subaltern subjects as the affectable I. Not surprisingly, 
the neoliberal program’s embracing of the logic of exclusion, 
61 Agamben (1995), p 148.
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which is to be corrected with inclusive democracy measures, 
renders this raciality’s power-effect all the more apparent. Yet it 
consistently escapes our critical eyes because it does not require 
the naming of racial difference, the specification of the many ways 
in which the racial subaltern subject fails to express or actualise 
post-Enlightenment principles, that which the logic exclusion has 
trained us to recognise as the manifestation of racial power.
Neither is the camp an appropriate metaphor for the favela 
nor does the refugee refigure the residents’ political (ethical-
juridical) position. Racial violence, unleashed in the in/difference 
that collapses administration of justice in/to law enforcement, 
immediately legitimating the state’s deployment of its forces 
of self-preservation, does not require stripping off signifiers of 
humanity. On the contrary, this collapsing is already inscribed in 
raciality, which produces humanity, the self-determined political 
(ethical-juridical) figure that thrives in ethical life, only because 
it institutes it in a relationship – united/separated by the lines of 
the Classical table – with another political figure (the affectable 
I) that stands before the horizon of death.
For this reason, I think, neither Agamben’s ban nor Schmitt’s 
friend/enemy pair are useful tools for the critique of racial 
subjugation. Raciality does its work because it is a referent of 
necessitas, the ruler of the stage of exteriority; its delineation of 
ethical life resists both postmodern deployments of historicity 
to write the racial subaltern out of moral fixity and neoliberal 
measures of inclusive democracy which promise (once again) 
to realise universality in all corners of the globe. As such, it 
undermines political projects that – because grounded on the 
transparency thesis, the ontological tale that announces ethical 
life – fail to recognise raciality’s political/symbolic task, its 
effect of power, which is the very writing of its boundaries. Put 
differently, because raciality prefigures the impossibility of both 
159
No-boDies: law, raciality and violence
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 9 – n. 1 – p. 119-162 – jan./jun. 2014
gestures, the critique of racial subjugation should target the very 
delineation of the territory of justice – that is, the ethical text 
sustaining our demands for recognition and legal redress should 
become the object of radical critique. When writing against 
renderings of nomos as a signifier of law, Carl Schmitt provides 
a useful tool for such critique. His objective here is to recuperate 
earlier articulations of the concept, in which nomos signifies the 
original ‘measure’, land appropriation which ‘grounds law’. ‘In 
every case,’ he argues, ‘land-appropriation, both internally and 
externally, is the primary legal title that underlie all subsequent 
law.’62 Nomos, he argues, ‘is the immediate form in which the 
political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible … 
the land-appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it 
and followed from it’;63 it is the signifier of ‘order and orientation’. 
In this formulation of the origins of political power, Schmitt 
removes the political authority from the Weberian (interior) region 
of meanings (motives) and, along with it, dismisses the ‘problem 
of legitimacy’ – the one which Foucault sees as intrinsic to the 
notion of right. Defining nomos as ‘the full immediacy of a legal 
power not mediated by laws’ as the ‘constitutive historical event 
– an act of legitimacy, whereby legality of mere law is first made 
meaningful’,64 he inscribes sovereignty on to the territory, thereby 
bracketing readings of law and the state as signifiers of interiority, 
as actualisations of the rational thing’s self-determination – as 
Hegel writes both of them.
In Schmitt’s rendering of nomos, I find the possibility for 
a reading of globality as a site of deployment of the modality of 
subjugation, racial violence, in which juridical and disciplinary 
62 Schmitt (2006), p 46.
63 Schmitt (2006), p 70.
64 Schmitt (2006), p 76.
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power merge. That is, it allows for an approach to the political 
that comprehends instances of racial violence, such as occupations 
of Rio’s favelas, as moments of political/symbolic ‘land-
reappropriation’. For these inscribe on to these territories – through 
the legitimate killing on site/sight of their residents – a kind of 
‘order and orientation’ (ethical life) that does not comprehend the 
favelas and their residents. Legitimacy is always already given – in 
exteriority – to these deployments of total violence because raciality 
renders the decision to kill residents of Rio’s favelas just because 
it is deemed necessary for the reinscription of the state’s authority. 
Because it functions, a priori, immediately (always-already) in 
representation, the deployment of architectures and procedures of 
security – occupations, military interventions, torture, summary 
executions, and so on – need no further justification. For raciality 
assures that, everywhere and anywhere, across the surface of the 
planet, that ever-threatening ‘other’ exists because already named; 
as such, it is an endless threat because its necessary difference 
consistently undermines the subject of ethical life’s arrogation of 
self-determination.
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